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Inflation Differentials among Czech Households* 
 
Pavel Hait, Petr Janský† 
 
Abstract 
Inflation rates have traditionally been measured by the annualized percentage change in the 
price level of a market basket of consumer goods and services purchased by households. The 
market basket represents the spending patterns of average household. However, 
households differ in their spending patterns and there are differences in the price changes of 
various goods and services. Therefore, different households experience different inflation 
rates. This paper finds that these differences have been significant in the Czech Republic 
during the period 1995-2010. Only around 60 % of households actually experienced an 
inflation rate that was similar to the national average. Furthermore, the higher the average 
inflation rate over time, the lower the percentage of households whose inflation rate was 
similar to that average. The main determiners of inflation were expenditures for housing and 
energy and, especially for low-income households and pensioners, expenditures on food and 
non-alcoholic drinks. In most years, pensioners and low-income households faced 
significantly higher inflation rates than the average rate for the whole population.  
 
Abstrakt 
Míra inflace se tradičně měří jako roční procentní změna cenové hladiny zboží ve spotřebním 
koši. Spotřební koš reprezentuje výdaje průměrné domácnosti. Nicméně, domácnosti se liší v 
tom, za co utrácejí, a existují i rozdíly v cenových změnách různých zboží a služeb. Různé 
domácnosti jsou tak vystaveny různým cenovým nárůstům. Tyto rozdíly byly signifikantní 
v České republice během období 1995-2010. Kolem 60 % domácností bylo vystaveno 
cenovým nárůstům v podobné výši jako průměrná míra inflace. Navíc čím vyšší byla 
průměrná inflace, tím menší procento domácností bylo vystaveno nárůstu cen blízko tomuto 
průměru. Nejdůležitější determinanty inflace byly výdaje za bydlení, energie a, především 
pro nízkopříjmové domácnosti a domácnosti důchodců, výdaje na jídlo a nealkoholické 
nápoje. Po většinu sledovaného období byly nízkopříjmové domácnosti a domácnosti 
důchodců vystaveny signifikantně vyšším nárůstům cen, než byla míra inflace. 
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1 Introduction 
The inflation rate was relatively high in the Czech Republic over the last two decades, with 
yearly rates of around 10% in the mid-1990s and a 6% rate in 2008. From a macroeconomic 
point of view, these magnitudes of price increases contributed, to the introduction of 
inflation targeting in 1998, while from a microeconomic point of view, they contributed to a 
debate about the costs of inflation. An important consideration that has largely been missing 
from this debate so far is the differential impact that inflation might have on various 
households, and we aim to fill this gap. 
Inflation has a direct influence on the living standards of the whole population. In addition, it 
has an indirect impact on many households through the so-called indexation of pensions, 
social benefits or private sector contracts. To be indexed for inflation, these social policies 
and contracts are often linked with the official rate of inflation; that, however, very often 
differs from the inflation really experienced by individual households.1 This indexation is 
common in the Czech Republic as well as in many other developed countries as discussed in 
Fernández (2012) or Whitehouse (2009), including the United States, as discussed in Webb & 
Willense (1995). All member countries of the European Union apply some kind of indexation 
to their pensions, as shown in the 2009 Ageing Report by Bogaert et. al. (2009), which 
provides a detailed overview of these policies. The indexation of Czech pensions was 
changed in 2012 and there will be further changes to come, if only due to the temporary 
status of the current laws, which are valid only until 2015. The current law indexes pensions 
according to the sum of one third of the growth rate of nominal wages and one third of the 
growth rate of the inflation rate. Most importantly, from the point of view of this current 
paper, the current law takes into account only the official rate of inflation for the whole of 
the Czech Republic, and not a pensioner-specific rate. 
The relatively important role of the official inflation rate is arguably driven to a large extent 
by the underlying assumption that it is the inflation rate faced by, if not all, then at least a 
majority of households. Yet this assumption might not reflect reality. Indeed, since specific 
groups of households have different spending patterns, and pay different prices for the 
same goods and services by shopping in different places, they may experience significantly 
different inflation rates. These potential differences could be reflected in the relevant 
policies.2 
There are prior studies that evaluate inflation rates for different demographic groups. While 
Prais (1959) laid the theoretical foundations, Snyder (1961) was most likely a pioneer in 
computing subgroup inflation rates, using US data from 1936 to 1955 to compute the 
inflation rates for low and high income groups. More recent examples of these types of 
analyses include Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999) for Spain, Crawford & Smith (2002) for the United 
Kingdom, Oosthuizen (2007) for South Africa, Sugema et al. (2010) for Indonesia. These 
studies often differ in their specific conclusions, but they generally concur that there is 
                                                     
1
 As stated by Czech Statistical Office (2013) on page 4, “Consumer price indices are used for the adjustment of 
wages, pensions and social income. Last, but not least, this information is also used in connection with the 
lease agreements or other agreements in which the revision of originally agreed financial performance 
reflecting the inflation is anchored.” 
2
 A specific foreign example of how differences in price levels and inflation can be reflected in relevant policies 
is the so called London allowance (or London weighting), which pays higher public sector wages for London-
based employees and has been researched for example by Davies & Wilson (2002). 
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significant dispersion among the inflation rates experienced by different households at any 
given point in time. However, there has essentially been no previous research in this area for 
the Czech Republic or, to the best of our knowledge, for any other Central or Eastern 
European or former transition country. 
This paper analyses inflation rates for individual households in the Czech Republic between 
1995 and 2010 and answers the following questions: Are region-specific inflation rates 
important? How representative is the official inflation rate? Do low-income households and 
pensioners face higher inflation? 
To answer these questions, we apply various methodological approaches in turn. We look 
for the difference between price expenditures of Prague households when computed in two 
different ways. We first of all use nationwide prices to compute the inflation rate for Prague 
households, and then compare this to an inflation rate obtained using Prague prices instead 
of nationwide ones. We also estimate the share of the population for which the average 
inflation rate can be considered representative and examine the relationship between the 
average inflation rate and its representativeness. We then discuss and estimate two 
different approaches to calculating the inflation rates. Finally, we analyse inflation 
differentials for the subgroups of low-income and pensioner households and identify the 
main determiners of higher inflation. 
The layout of the paper is as follows: the methodology is explained in Section 2; the main 
datasets used for the analysis are described in Section 3; the bias caused by the application 
of nationwide prices instead of region-specific prices is evaluated in Section 4; the 
representativeness of the official Czech inflation rate is measured in Section 5; Section 6 
discusses various possibilities for computing subgroup inflation rates; Section 7 analyses the 
magnitudes and drivers of subgroup inflation rates for pensioners and low-income 
households; and the  conclusion is found in Section 8. 
2 Methodology 
This section discusses inflation rate measurement and introduces terminology that will be 
used throughout the paper. The official inflation rate is the inflation rate published by the 
Czech Statistical Office (CZSO). The specific inflation rate is the inflation rate to which a given 
household is exposed. The subgroup inflation rate is the inflation rate which impacts a given 
subgroup of households. When the subgroup is a whole population of households, the 
subgroup inflation rate is the aggregate inflation rate. 
When estimating inflation rate in order to measure real changes in the cost of living, we 
have to deal with the problem that, as noted by Hobijn & Lagakos (2005, page 582),it is well 
known from price index theory that calculating an exact index of the cost of living is not 
feasible. Instead, the measure of the average change in the cost of living in a period t is 
usually approximated by a change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is calculated by 
the Laspeyres index: 
(1)        
∑           
 
   
∑             
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where       is the change in the CPI in period t,      is the quantity of good or service a 
consumed in period t in a whole economy,      price of good or service a in period t, n is the 
number of different goods or services.3 
 
As Crawford & Smith( 2002) discuss, for example, the CPI is not a true cost-of-living index, 
because a cost-of-living index measures the average change in prices with reference not to a 
fixed list of demands, but to a fixed standard of living. Since the CPI assumes there is no 
substitution when relative prices change, it corresponds to the upper limit of the true 
growth of the cost-of-living index.4 When there are no significant changes in prices, it can be 
assumed that the bias is low, since households are not motivated to substantially change 
their expenditure patterns.  
Unfortunately, the data on quantities consumed that are necessary for the evaluation of 
formula (1) are not usually available, only data on expenditure for a given good or service. 
Also, data on prices are usually less costly to obtain than data on expenditures, and 
therefore price data are more readily available than expenditure data. With these 
limitations, the CPI change is computed as: 
(2)       
∑    
    
   
 
   
∑    
      
   
 
   
   
where               is the expenditure on a good or service a in at time t in a whole economy, 
    is the base time period. 
The CZSO changes the base period approximately every five years, as this is their interval for 
conducting major updates to the expenditure structure.5 In the US, according to Greenlees & 
Mason (1996), the index is updated approximately every 10 years. As underlined by Hobijn & 
Lagakos (2005, page 583), infrequent updating of the base period can be a major source of 
substitution bias, because it means that the CPI does not take properly into account the fact 
that people substitute goods that become relatively cheaper for goods that become 
relatively more expensive. In this paper, the expenditures are updated in every period when 
the inflation rate is computed (so       is set). This has two advantages, as in Hobijn & 
Lagakos (2005, page 583): the analysis is not limited by dependence on the selection of a 
particular base period, and the substitution bias is reduced. For our computations the 
aggregate inflation rate at time t is defined as: 
(3)     
∑       
    
      
 
   
∑       
 
   
   
Defining the relative price change of a specific good or service a at the time t as: 
(4)      
    
      
   
                                                     
3
 Alternatively, there is the GDP deflator, defined as                
∑         
 
   
∑           
 
   
  , and computed by 
the Paasche index. Unlike the CPI, the basket of goods for the GDP deflator is allowed to change from year to 
year and therefore can account for substitution bias. 
4
 This is discussed in Abraham et al. (1998, page 2) or Crawford & Smith (2002, page 3), and an extensive 
review of sources of CPI bias in measuring the cost-of-living index is provided in Garvey & Murphy (2004, pages 
11 and 12). For example, according to Boskin et al. (1998, page 44), the US CPI overestimates the true cost-of-
living index by 1.1%. 
5
 An expert from the CZSO, Iva Šedivá, provided us with the information that between 1999 and 2012, there 
were updates in 1999, 2005, and 2009. 
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The definition of an aggregate inflation rate can be rewritten as: 
(5)     
∑       
    
      
 
   
∑       
 
   
 
∑       (      )
 
   
∑       
 
   
   
∑           
 
   
∑       
 
   
 
Following (5), the specific inflation rate of a household h at time t can be defined as: 
(6)      
∑            
 
   
∑        
 
   
   
where        is the expenditure of a household h for a good or service a at time t. 
There are two possible approaches to calculating the aggregate or subgroup inflation rates: 
democratic and plutocratic averages. One of the first authors to extensively discuss the 
problem of multiple possibilities when computing the aggregate or subgroup inflation rate 
was Prais (1959), while the differences between democratic and plutocratic averages were 
more recently discussed by Artsev et al. 2006) and by Crawford & Smith (2002). The 
plutocratic average resembles the official inflation rate in that it is weighted by households’ 
total expenditures, while the democratic average is a democratically-weighted average, 
where each household has the same weight. Formally, the democratic average for a 
subgroup x at time t is the arithmetic average of specific inflation rates at time t of all 
households from x: 
(7)      
∑     
 
   
 
 
where      is the specific inflation rate of household h (in this case, belonging to subgroup x) 
at time t, m is the number of households in subgroup x. 
The plutocratic average for subgroup x at time t is defined as: 
(8)       
∑            
 
   
∑        
 
   
 
Definition (8) is very similar to the definition of the specific inflation rate (6), but instead of 
the expenditures of household h for good or service a at time t (      ), the expenditures of 
subgroup x for good or service a at time t is used (      ). Households are weighted equally in 
the case of (7), the democratic average, whereas in the case of (8), the plutocratic average, 
households with higher expenditures have higher weights and vice versa. The CPI change is 
constructed as a plutocratic average. It is usually easier to compute in this way, as only the 
price indices and the aggregated expenditure shares of goods and services are needed, 
whereas for the computation of the democratic average the specific inflation rates for every 
household must be evaluated, as discussed for example in Artsev et al. (2006) and Kokoski 
(2000). The difference between the plutocratic and the democratic average is called 
plutocratic bias.  
3 Data 
To compute the variables of interest using the formulas defined in the previous section, we 
need data on household characteristics and expenditures on various goods and services, as 
well as data on relative price developments for various goods and services. These data sets 
come from the CZSO in the form of the Household Budget Survey (HBS) and in price data 
gathered for the purpose of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We used the HBS annual data 
for 1994 to 2009, and the CPI nationwide price indices from 1994 to 2010, as well as the CPI 
price indices for the Prague region from 2001 to 2010. 
The HBS contains very detailed data on the income, expenditures, and other characteristics 
of a sample of Czech households, and has been previously used in recent microeconomic 
6 
 
analyses such as Dušek & Janský (2012). Specifically, the data provides information for 
around 250 expenditure groups (goods and services), approximately60 demographic 
identifiers, and around 30 income items, for a representative sample of approximately 3000 
households in the Czech Republic. It is the most detailed dataset of its kind for the Czech 
Republic. The composition of the sample is amended, usually annually, to maintain a high 
level of representativeness.6 The size of the survey and the number of observed attributes 
changes slightly year to year. There are some potential confounders of the 
representativeness of HBS, but we do not consider them particularly influential, especially in 
the data collected since 2006, not least on the basis of analysis in Dybczak et al. (2010).7 Let 
us also note that the sample for the household budget survey was selected by purposive 
quota sampling. The designers of the survey have made efforts to make it as similar to a 
random sample as possible, but nevertheless its characteristics are not the same as those of 
a random sample, in general. One implication of this suboptimal sampling is that the results 
of hypothesis testing on the data might be biased or misleading. However, we believe that 
our use of the data is consistent and in line with the efforts of CZSO to make the sample 
resemble a random sample as closely as possible, as well as with previous uses of the data 
such as Dybczak et al. (2010). 
This paper uses some HBS variables for sorting households into subgroups. Data about 
financial expenditure are fully utilised. In-kind income and expenditure are not used in the 
computation of various inflation rates. For most of the goods and services, the survey does 
not contain the number of units bought, but only expenditure on these goods and services. 
Therefore, a dataset of prices is needed in order to be able to evaluate the inflation rates. 
The CZSO collects price data on a monthly basis for the purpose of the CPI for all units in the 
consumer basket, which has around 700 units. These detailed data are, however, only for 
the internal purposes of CZSO including the computation of the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (introduced by Eurostat and employed by the European Central Bank for 
the purposes of monetary policy in Eurozone). For this research, it was only possible to 
obtain the monthly price indices of 145 groups of goods and services, from 1991 to 2010, 
aggregated for the whole Czech Republic. The equivalent price indices specific to the Prague 
region for 2001-2011 were also available. These are the most detailed time-series datasets 
of Czech prices that are available to researchers. The number of price indices allocated to 
                                                     
6
 Every household in the sample is allocated a specific coefficient (COEF) that indicates its weight in the sample. 
These COEFs are employed in order to obtain a representative sample. The existence of COEFs makes 
computations more demanding, as households must be always weighted by their COEFs. In this paper, this 
weighting is always included; sometimes it is explicitly described. 
7
 A short discussion of potential confounders of HBS resulting in its potential non-representativeness, most 
relevant to the pre-2006 data, follows. First, institutional households and homeless people are not included in 
the survey by the European Communities (2004). Also, the sample might be too small because the ratio of the 
number of households surveyed to the number of households in the actual population was the second lowest 
among 13 European countries according to European Communities (2004). Furthermore, as Crawford & Smith 
(2002) discuss, systematic over- or under-reporting of expenditures can occur in this type of data collection, 
due to forgetfulness (e.g. consumption outside the home), active concealment (e.g. receipt from a beauty 
studio), and guilt (e.g. cigarettes). And, since some expenditures are recorded monthly, large and infrequent 
purchases may be underestimated. The treatment of these confounders is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
and it is assumed in line with Dybczak et al. (2010) and other similar studies that they are not very significant. 
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every first-level Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) expenditure 
category varies.8 
Since the data provided from the HBS are annual, no use is made of the fact that the price 
index data are available on a monthly basis; only the annual averages are used in the 
inflation computations. There is a wide dispersion among the development of relative prices 
even if we examine only the highly aggregated cumulative price indices for 12 groups of 
goods and services according to the first level of the COICOP from 1994 to 2010. Using 1994 
as a base equal to 100%, housing and fuel costs and health costs grew by more than 200%. In 
contrast, the average nominal prices of clothing and footwear were the same in 1994 as in 
2010, and furnishing and household equipment and maintenance grew by just 16% over the 
period. 
The structure of the expenditure breakdown in the HBS is different from the price indices 
breakdown provided by the CZSO. Therefore we constructed a conversion table linking 
variables from the financial expenditures of HBS to the specific price index from the set of 
145 price indices in order to compute inflation rates as defined in the previous section. The 
conversion was quite clear for many variables, since the name of the variable in the 
expenditures list and the price index are the same or very similar. As the number and 
structure of observed variables within the financial expenditures in HBS varies somewhat 
from year to year, conversion tables for different years sometimes vary slightly.  
4 Nationwide versus Prague prices 
This section analyses the size of the bias in inflation rate computation that is introduced by 
assuming that households from different regions within a country face the same (i.e. 
nationwide) prices. There are existing papers that evaluate inflation rates with respect to the 
region where the household is located (for example Garner et al., 1996, page 36)), but these 
assume the same nationwide prices for specific goods for all households, so the differences 
in inflation rates they observe are attained owing to regional differences in consumption 
patterns. Previous studies admit that there are price differences for the same goods in 
different regions Čadil et al. (2012, page 10) and shops O’Donoghue et al. (2007), but, as 
argued by Hobijn & Lagakos (2005), the assumption that all households encounter the same 
prices for the same goods and services is very widespread because regional price indices are 
only rarely available.  
As the available data make it possible, we compare inflation rates for Prague households 
using both nationwide and Prague price indices for years 2002-2010. Table 1 shows this 
comparison. The use of nationwide prices generally seems to overestimate the price 
increases, when compared to the values using Prague prices, with the exception of two 
                                                     
8
 Distribution of price indices among expenditure categories according to the first level of COICOP categories 
(number of price indices in the brackets): 1. Food, Non-Alcoholic Beverages (14); 2. Alcoholic Beverages, 
Tobacco (7); 3. Clothing, Footwear (9); 4. Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas, Other Fuels (17); 5. Furnishings, 
Household Equipment, Routine Household Maintenance (17); 6. Health (10); 7. Transport (16); 8. 
Communication (4); 9. Recreation, Culture (24); 10. Education (6); 11. Restaurants, Hotels (5); 12. 
Miscellaneous Goods, Services (16). 
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years, 2003 and 2009.9 So using Prague prices instead of nationwide prices in calculations for 
the past decade would result in lower inflation rates being reported for Prague households, 
and this would likely better reflect the reality experienced by Prague households. 
Table 1: Prague households democratic average inflation rates for various price indices 
Democratic average 
inflation rate 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Avg. 
Prague households, 
Prague price indices 
1.30% 0.68% 2.55% 1.48% 2.20% 2.36% 6.64% 1.80% 1.27% 2.25% 
Prague households, 
nationwide price 
indices 
1.74% -0.01% 2.78% 1.71% 2.59% 2.78% 7.17% 1.77% 1.83% 2.48% 
All households, 
nationwide price 
indices 
1.22% -0.32% 2.69% 1.61% 2.54% 2.56% 6.73% 1.50% 1.34% 2.16% 
 
The Prague region is overall very distinct from other Czech regions and therefore the bias for 
the Prague region caused by the usage of nationwide price indices could be assumed to be 
an upper limit for any other regional biases that we cannot examine due to a lack of regional 
data. Still, on the basis of the Prague analysis, it seems clear that the bias introduced by the 
assumption that households from all regions face the same inflation is substantial. 
This bias is not usually taken into account in research, but more importantly, is not taken 
into account in public policies such as the indexation of pensions, which aim to keep up with 
the rising cost of living. Further analysis that took into account not only these region-specific 
inflation differentials, but also region-specific price levels that we do not study here, could 
lead to recommendations for region-specific indexation. As with any policy change, this 
should be further evaluated on the basis of the presumed benefits and costs of, for example, 
the policy’s implementation and associated administration. 
5 Average inflation rate representativeness  
This section analyses the representativeness of the average inflation rate since, as noted by 
Leicester et al. (2008), any measure of inflation is necessarily only an average of the 
experience of different households and may not be particularly representative of what is 
happening for any household in particular. For the purposes of this paper, the aggregate 
democratic inflation rate is considered representative for a given household if the specific 
inflation rate of that household is “very close” to it. Leicester et al. (2008) proposed two 
measures of "closeness" and applied them to the UK data. The second measure is also used 
on UK data by Crawford & Smith (2002) and on Israeli data by Artsev et al. (2006). Both of 
these measures are applied in this paper and so our results can be compared with those for 
the UK, and partially with those for Israel.  
Leicester et al. (2008) define the first measure (Measure 1) as the answer to the question of 
how many households have an inflation rate that is more than 25 per cent away from the 
                                                     
9
 Furthermore, using a standard t-test with the Prague household subsample, the difference between the 
democratic average inflation rate using nationwide prices and Prague prices is significantly negative in all cases 
at 99.9% confidence level, except for 2003 and 2009. In 2003, it is significantly positive, while in 2009 it is not 
significantly different from zero. 
9 
 
mean inflation rate in each year. The second measure (Measure 2) is then the answer to the 
question of how many households experience inflation that is more than 1 percentage point 
away from the mean. The two measures will therefore produce different results and, as 
Leicester et al. (2008) note, the former will tend to suggest that many households are far 
from the mean when inflation is very low, whereas the latter will suggest many households 
are far from the mean when inflation is very high. 
Formally, we define the two measures in the following way. Measure 1: 
if         〈           〉  ⇔       
       if         〈           〉  ⇔       
Measure 2: 
   (         ) ⇔       
where C is the subset of specific inflation rates which are “close” to the democratic inflation 
rate,   is the democratic inflation rate,    is the specific inflation rate for a household h.
10 
Table 2 shows the estimated ratios of representativeness and the democratic average 
inflation rate for 1995-2010. The average proportions of households fulfilling measures 1 
and 2 for closeness over the whole period are 53% and 64%, respectively. In the UK, based 
on Leicester et al. (2008), in 1995-2008, the ratios were 46% and 52% respectively.11 In 
Israel, in 1999-2005, the average measure 2 ratio was 58% Artsev et al. (2006). 
Table 2: Estimated ratios of representativeness of official inflation rate over time (%) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
Democratic inflation rate 9.2 9.3 8.8 11.1 1.9 3.1 5.0 1.2  
Measure 1 97.4 93.4 87.7 74.1 47.6 41.5 66.3 26.3  
Measure 2 73.2 65.9 56.2 31.5 77.8 54.2 55.7 72.3  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Avg. 
Democratic inflation rate -0.3 2.7 1.6 2.5 2.6 6.7 1.5 1.3 4.3 
Measure 1 10.3 62.4 36.6 45.8 44.4 65.0 29.1 27.6 53.5 
Measure 2 87.0 79.5 73.8 64.1 64.1 42.0 64.9 67.3 64.3 
 
Table 2 also confirms our expectations that the two measures will vary, and in what ways. 
For example when the inflation was relatively low around 2003, Measure 1 does suggest that 
many households are far from the mean, whereas when inflation was relatively very high in 
2008, Measure 2 suggests that many households are far from the mean. 
Crawford & Smith (2002) further analysed whether the magnitude of an aggregate 
democratic inflation rate was significantly associated with lower representativeness, using 
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 As described earlier, the representativeness of a household in a sample is determined by its COEF number 
and we use these as weights. A procedure is applied for both measures in which all coefficients belonging to 
the households whose specific inflation rate falls into C are summed, and the sum is divided by the sum of 
coefficients of all households in the sample. Formally:   
∑   
 
   
∑   
 
   
, where R is the estimated ratio of population 
whose specific inflation rate is close to the democratic average inflation rate, n is the number of households 
whose computed specific inflation rate is close to the democratic average inflation rate, m is the total number 
of households in the sample, and    is the COEF of the household i. 
11
 Leicester et al. (2008) provided a chart on page 22, but no exact numbers, so we have estimated this average 
from their chart. 
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UK data from the period 1975- 1999, by using the ordinary least squares to regress the 
Measure 2 ratio on the aggregate democratic inflation rate. The value of the estimated 
coefficient of aggregate democratic inflation rate was -1.7 with standard error 0.5. Artsev et 
al. (2006) performed the same test on the Israeli 1999-2005 data, and the value of the 
estimate was -0.7.12 The result of this regression estimated on the Czech data is -2.5. 
The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (p-value 
0.009), and is lower than that for the UK and Israeli data. The regression is based only on a 
very small number of observations (16) and the data analysis also indicated possible 
heteroskedasticity. The p-value of the Breusch-Pagan test is 0.055. Running the regression 
with robust standard errors, the estimate is still significant at the 95% confidence level (p-
value 0.028). 
Overall, the average inflation rate was representative for only around 60% of the Czech 
households, with significant changes over time and depending on the measure used. We find 
a statistically significant negative association between the average inflation rate and the 
representativeness, approximated by Measure 2 ratio, which is in line with the previous 
results on the UK and Israeli data. 
6 Plutocratic versus democratic average inflation rate 
This section presents empirical evidence on aggregate plutocratic and democratic inflation 
rates and thus continues the discussion of these two terms begun in Section 2.  
Table 3 provides a comparison of the annual aggregate democratic and plutocratic averages. 
It includes also the difference between the two averages, the so called plutocratic bias, as 
well as the official inflation rate and also the GDP deflator. 
Table 3: Average plutocratic, democratic, official inflation rate and plutocratic bias 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
Plutocratic average 8.9 8.9 8.4 10.1 1.9 3.8 4.6 1.0  
Democratic average 9.2 9.3 8.8 11.1 1.9 3.1 5.0 1.2  
Plutocratic bias -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9 0.0 0.7 -0.4 -0.3  
Official inflation rate (CPI) 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8  
GDP deflator 9.9 7.9 9.7 2.5 1.4 4.6 2.6 9.9  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Avg. 
Plutocratic average -0.4 2.5 1.3 2.2 2.3 6.1 1.1 1.1 4.0 
Democratic average -0.3 2.7 1.6 2.5 2.6 6.7 1.5 1.3 4.3 
Plutocratic bias -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 
Official inflation rate (CPI) 0.1 2.8 1.9 2.5 2.8 6.3 1.0 1.5 4.3 
GDP deflator 0.9 4.0 -0.3 0.5 3.3 1.9 2.3 -1.6 3.0 
Source: Plutocratic average and bias and democratic average is computed as explained in the 
text, and the official CPI and the GDP deflator is taken from the CZSO 
                                                     
12
 Variance was not provided by Artsev et al. (2006) and so the statistical significance cannot be judged. 
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The average of the aggregate plutocratic inflation rate over the whole period is 4.0%; for the 
democratic inflation rate 4.3%; for the official inflation rate 4.3% (CPI).13 The average of the 
GDP deflator is lower than of the CPI as expected due to the substitution bias of the CPI. The 
plutocratic bias, which is the democratic average subtracted from the plutocratic average, is 
negative for most of the period.14 One of the implications is that better offhouseholds faced 
a lower inflation rate than poorer households in most years. A summary of 12 empirical 
studies about the plutocratic bias is discussed in Ley (2005) and the conclusion is that the 
sign and magnitude of the bias varies heavily across countries and years.   
Oosthuizen (2007) argues that the weighting methodology (democratic or plutocratic 
average) should be selected based on the purpose for which the computed inflation rate is 
used. So in the case of monitoring economy-wide consumer price inflation, the price index 
should reflect the structure of economy-wide consumer spending and therefore the use of 
the plutocratic average is recommended.  On the other hand, the democratic average should 
be used where the price index is used in relation to one given population subgroup; for 
example, for adjusting pensions in order to maintain the real purchasing power of 
pensioners. Therefore the democratic averages are used to represent the subgroup inflation 
rates in this study. As argued by Leicester et al. (2008), there is no reason why high-income 
families should have more weight in determining subgroup inflation rates.  
As discussed by Oosthuizen (2007) and Moulton & Stewart (1999), there are a number of 
problems that can affect the calculation of subgroup inflation rates. The two most important 
seem to be, first, that the number of households in a subgroup is generally smaller than the 
total number of households (so the result might not be representative); and, second, that 
the data on prices are collected from shops that are chosen as representative of the whole 
population, and this might not be applicable to a particular subgroup.15 Subgroup inflation 
rates may be biased for these reasons. For the Czech Republic, we believe that the bias 
caused by the second of these issues might be more important than that caused by the first, 
since both of the subgroups we analyse in the next section are represented by hundreds of 
observations in HBS every year.16 
7 Pensioner household and low-income household subgroups 
In this section we analyse subgroup inflation rates for pensioner households and low-income 
households as well as the main influences on these rates. We define a pensioner household 
                                                     
13
 In theory, using the same dataset and methodology as the CZSO should imply that the plutocratic average 
equals the official inflation rate. In practice, we use a different dataset (as the most detailed CZSO dataset is 
not available to researchers) and different methodology (one difference that we are aware of is that we update 
the expenditure shares every year whereas the CZSO updates these roughly every five years; this should lead to 
a lower substitution bias in the aggregate plutocratic inflation rate). These differences might explain why the 
aggregate plutocratic inflation rate shown here is on average lower than the official inflation rate. 
14
 At a 99% confidence level, the plutocratic bias was significantly negative for all years except 1999, when the 
difference was not significant, and 2000, when it was significantly positive. 
15
 According to Ley (2005, page 641), the Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, which 
computes several subgroup inflation rates, solved this problem by collecting distinctive prices for every 
subgroup (based on a sample of shops visited by the respective subgroup). 
16
 The bias caused by the second reason might be important, but there is no easy way we could test this with 
the currently available data. It might theoretically be tested by comparing the CPI prices with household-
specific unit values derived from the HBS, and we consider this an interesting area for future research. 
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in line with the CZSO as a household in which there are no economically active members and 
whose head is a pensioner. Low-income households were defined in various ways in 
previous studies, and we present these in Table 4. 
Table 4. Various definitions of low-income households 
Study Definition  
(Sugema et al. 2010) 
Per capita income of a household below specified absolute 
threshold 
(Artsev et al. 2006) Per capita net income in lowest 10% of the distribution 
(Garvey & Murphy 2004) Lowest 10% of the households income distribution 
(Crawford & Smith 2002) Lowest 10% of the households income distribution 
(Garner et al. 1996)  
  
1.Income below given absolute poverty threshold 
2. Expenditures below given absolute poverty threshold 
3. Participation in selected welfare programs 
(Blank & Blinder 1985) Lowest 20% of the households income distribution 
(Hagemann 1982) Income of a household below absolute specified threshold 
We consider the status of low-income as having a relative rather than absolute meaning: a 
low-income household is defined as one with an income in the lowest 10% of the income 
distribution in a given year.17 Once again, we ensure representativeness.18 Table 5 compares 
democratic inflation rates for three groups:  the so called aggregate covers the whole 
population, whereas the other two democratic inflation rates focus on pensioners and low-
income households. 
Table 5: Democratic inflation rates – aggregate, low-income households, pensioners 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 Aggregate  9.2 9.3 8.8 11.1 1.9 3.1 5.0 1.2 
 Pensioner households 10.0 9.8 9.8 12.0 1.9 3.4 6.1 1.6 
 Low-income households 9.3 9.8 9.2 12.9 2.2 3.6 6.5 2.1 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Avg. 
Aggregate  -0.3 2.7 1.6 2.5 2.6 6.7 1.5 1.3 4.3 
Pensioner households -0.1 3.0 2.1 3.3 2.5 8.1 1.6 1.4 4.8 
Low-income households -0.2 3.1 2.3 3.7 2.6 8.5 1.4 1.5 4.9 
 
The average of the aggregate democratic inflation rate for the whole sample for the sample 
period is, as mentioned earlier, 4.3%, while it is 4.8% for low-income households, and 4.9% 
for pensioner households. Both subgroup inflation rates are higher than the aggregate rate 
in most years.19 Using the same data as in Table 5, and considering 1994 as a base year with 
a price level equal to 100% for all groups of households, the cumulative inflation in 2010 
would be 193% for the whole sample, 209% for pensioner households, and 213% for low-
income households. These differences seem substantial to us, and in our opinion deserve 
                                                     
17
 This threshold is selected in compliance with a number of other authors who run similar analyses (Table 4). 
18
 Specifically, we ensure the best possible representativeness by defining the 10% threshold so that the sum of 
COEFs of households with incomes below that threshold equalled 10% of the total sum of COEFs. 
19
 Using Welch's one-tailed t-test, the pensioner rate is significantly greater than the aggregate rate at a 95% 
confidence level in every year except 1999, 2007, 2009 and 2010.  Almost the same holds for low-income 
households, whose inflation rate is significantly greater except in 2007, 2009, and 2010. Also, it can be 
hypothesised that low-income households face the same inflation rate as pensioner households. However, 
using Welch's two-tailed t-test, the rates are, at the 95% confidence level, not significantly different only in 6 of 
the years studied: 1996, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009, and 2010. 
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the attention of policy makers, for example, when planning the indexation of pensions or 
social benefits. 
Let us compare our results with the existing literature for other countries. Looking only at 
papers that analyse periods of at least 5 years, many have concluded that low-income 
households faced a higher than average inflation rate (for example, Stewart ,2008 on US 
data, Garvey & Murphy ,2004 on Irish data, and Sugema et al. ,2010 on Indonesian data), 
some concluded that they faced overall the same inflation rate as the average (Artsev et al. 
,2006 on Israeli data), and some concluded that they faced lower inflation (Crawford & Smith 
2002 on UK data). Blank & Blinder (1985) examined a very long period from 1947 to 1982 
using US data, and concluded that on average there is no difference. Generally, poor 
households are less able to substitute when the price of the goods and services they buy 
increases. Therefore, the bias of the CPI as an estimator of true inflation rates (caused by the 
assumption of constant expenditure patterns as price changes) is lower for them than for 
richer households. Furthermore, the aggregate inflation rate is biased upward more than the 
low-income households’ inflation rate. Therefore, our estimated difference between results 
for the subgroups and for the whole sample might be even greater in reality. The same 
argument holds for pensioners, if only because, on average, they also belong to poorer 
households. 
The results for pensioners are similarly varied. For example, Hobijn & Lagakos (2005) 
concluded based on US data that pensioners faced on average a higher inflation rate, while  
Crawford & Smith (2002) arrived at the opposite conclusion based on UK data, and Lieu et al. 
(2004) found on average no difference between the two rates, based on data from Taiwan..  
While summarising various studies on subgroup price indices, Oosthuizen (2007) concluded 
that no single group experiences consistently higher or lower rates of inflation in the long 
run, relative to other groups . Assuming that price indices develop differently, and that 
subgroups have different spending patterns among countries, there is no reason that there 
should be worldwide similar trends among subgroup inflation rates in comparison to the 
national aggregate inflation rates. 
To determine the biggest contributors to the inflation rate to which a subgroup is exposed, 
the relative contribution of expenditure on a specific good or service i to the plutocratic 
inflation rate at the period t for sub-population x can be calculated as:   
(9)                
            
|∑            
 
   |
 
For a better aggregated illustration, we divide all goods and services monitored by HBS into 
12 groups according to the first level of COICOP. The relative contribution of expenditure on 
a specific group of goods and services k (  {        }) to the subgroup plutocratic 
inflation rate at a period t for sub-group x is calculated as:  
(10)         
∑             
 
   
|∑            
 
   |
 
where m is the total number of specific goods/services in the group k. The absolute 
contribution of expenditure on a specific group of goods and services k (  {        }) to 
the subgroup plutocratic inflation rate at a period t for sub-group x can be defined as20: 
                                                     
20
 Since the weight of a household in the whole sample is determined by its COEF, the expenditures are 
weighted according to the COEFs of the households in order to maintain representativeness (this is not shown 
in the equations). 
14 
 
(11)        (
∑             
 
   
∑            
 
   
)      (
∑             
 
   
∑            
 
   
) (
∑            
 
   
∑        
 
   
)  
∑             
 
   
∑        
 
   
 
Table 6 shows the absolute contribution of various expenditures of the whole sample, 
pensioner households, and low-income households towards their inflation rates. The biggest 
“increasers" (expenditure on a given subgroup of goods and services causing an absolute 
growth in inflation rate greater than 1%) are depicted in bold, the biggest “reducer” 
(expenditure on a given subgroup of goods and services causing an absolute fall in the 
inflation rate by more than 1%) in bold italic. Columns 1-12 refer to the first level of COICOP 
categories and are listed below the tables in the notes. 
 
Table 6. Contributors to inflation rate in absolute terms; how much each of the groups 
contributed to inflation rate 
Whole sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1995 1.92% 0.32% 1.03% 1.66% 0.51% 0.20% 0.72% 0.20% 0.82% 0.36% 0.58% 0.63% 
1996 1.59% 0.40% 0.93% 1.84% 0.31% 0.21% 1.67% 0.19% 0.61% 0.25% 0.40% 0.55% 
1997 0.77% 0.27% 0.79% 2.80% 0.40% 0.31% 1.05% 0.21% 0.66% 0.21% 0.39% 0.54% 
1998 1.00% 0.37% 0.54% 4.81% 0.39% 0.22% 0.58% 0.21% 0.67% 0.29% 0.52% 0.53% 
1999 -0.64% 0.12% 0.05% 1.20% 0.09% 0.05% 0.32% 0.27% 0.05% 0.13% 0.11% 0.13% 
2000 0.13% 0.12% -0.15% 1.68% 0.00% 0.04% 1.17% 0.15% 0.23% 0.03% 0.13% 0.24% 
2001 0.84% 0.11% -0.15% 2.54% 0.00% 0.06% -0.04% 0.21% 0.46% 0.02% 0.19% 0.35% 
2002 -0.44% 0.06% -0.20% 1.13% -0.01% 0.08% -0.32% 0.05% 0.14% 0.03% 0.21% 0.23% 
2003 -0.43% 0.04% -0.51% 0.28% -0.16% 0.10% 0.06% -0.23% -0.16% 0.03% 0.15% 0.42% 
2004 0.52% 0.11% -0.34% 0.63% -0.17% 0.12% 0.38% 0.59% -0.01% 0.02% 0.36% 0.29% 
2005 -0.06% 0.04% -0.35% 0.93% -0.16% 0.16% 0.22% 0.24% 0.04% 0.02% 0.27% -0.01% 
2006 0.16% 0.03% -0.39% 1.66% -0.11% 0.10% 0.21% 0.23% 0.03% 0.03% 0.21% 0.04% 
2007 0.69% 0.33% -0.05% 1.03% -0.03% 0.11% 0.02% -0.04% -0.04% 0.02% 0.19% 0.04% 
2008 1.18% 0.30% -0.08% 2.89% 0.03% 0.79% 0.31% -0.15% 0.05% 0.02% 0.44% 0.29% 
2009 0.18% 0.14% -0.17% 0.43% -0.05% 0.20% 0.48% -0.12% -0.20% 0.01% 0.15% 0.01% 
2010 0.17% 0.14% -0.16% 0.46% -0.05% 0.19% 0.47% -0.12% -0.16% 0.01% 0.15% 0.01% 
 
Pensioner sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1995 4.25% 0.24% 0.52% 2.38% 0.28% 0.25% 0.40% 0.26% 0.41% 0.20% 0.29% 0.33% 
1996 3.56% 0.31% 0.50% 2.64% 0.20% 0.27% 1.01% 0.22% 0.30% 0.13% 0.21% 0.33% 
1997 1.78% 0.24% 0.48% 4.17% 0.30% 0.35% 0.72% 0.27% 0.61% 0.10% 0.19% 0.36% 
1998 1.40% 0.34% 0.32% 7.11% 0.38% 0.29% 0.38% 0.25% 0.58% 0.13% 0.27% 0.45% 
1999 -1.93% 0.13% 0.04% 2.27% 0.12% 0.07% 0.29% 0.39% 0.15% 0.08% 0.08% 0.13% 
2000 0.27% 0.09% -0.08% 2.86% 0.03% 0.04% 0.22% 0.20% 0.21% 0.00% 0.08% 0.14% 
2001 1.59% 0.11% -0.05% 3.04% -0.01% 0.10% 0.03% 0.19% 0.47% 0.00% 0.07% 0.31% 
2002 -0.55% 0.06% -0.09% 1.40% 0.00% 0.12% -0.19% 0.12% 0.19% 0.00% 0.08% 0.25% 
2003 -0.65% 0.04% -0.20% 0.27% -0.10% 0.11% 0.03% -0.08% 0.08% 0.00% 0.05% 0.27% 
2004 1.01% 0.09% -0.15% 0.83% -0.11% 0.11% 0.15% 0.61% 0.15% 0.00% 0.18% 0.23% 
2005 -0.10% 0.02% -0.20% 1.31% -0.15% 0.28% 0.20% 0.31% 0.17% 0.00% 0.11% 0.01% 
2006 0.28% 0.03% -0.22% 2.21% -0.09% 0.16% 0.14% 0.27% 0.19% 0.00% 0.08% 0.06% 
2007 1.18% 0.20% -0.02% 1.02% -0.03% 0.15% 0.06% 0.01% 0.13% 0.00% 0.07% 0.05% 
2008 2.17% 0.22% -0.04% 3.52% 0.01% 1.02% 0.25% -0.06% 0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.24% 
2009 0.33% 0.12% -0.08% 0.46% -0.04% 0.30% 0.42% -0.08% -0.09% 0.00% 0.07% 0.04% 
2010 0.31% 0.13% -0.08% 0.50% -0.04% 0.29% 0.25% -0.08% -0.09% 0.00% 0.07% 0.04% 
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Low-income sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1995 3.74% 0.24% 0.74% 2.01% 0.29% 0.12% 0.34% 0.14% 0.44% 0.27% 0.39% 0.41% 
1996 3.51% 0.36% 0.66% 2.33% 0.18% 0.14% 1.21% 0.15% 0.31% 0.17% 0.29% 0.40% 
1997 1.66% 0.24% 0.65% 3.54% 0.29% 0.21% 0.66% 0.20% 0.48% 0.15% 0.35% 0.49% 
1998 1.41% 0.31% 0.32% 7.80% 0.35% 0.28% 0.38% 0.26% 0.55% 0.13% 0.32% 0.45% 
1999 -1.87% 0.12% 0.03% 2.82% 0.11% 0.06% 0.11% 0.42% 0.14% 0.05% 0.09% 0.14% 
2000 0.27% 0.09% -0.08% 2.86% 0.03% 0.04% 0.22% 0.20% 0.21% 0.00% 0.08% 0.14% 
2001 1.78% 0.11% -0.07% 3.78% 0.00% 0.07% 0.05% 0.22% 0.26% 0.00% 0.11% 0.19% 
2002 -0.57% 0.05% -0.11% 1.93% 0.02% 0.13% 0.00% 0.17% 0.23% 0.01% 0.13% 0.13% 
2003 -0.62% 0.02% -0.19% 0.37% -0.07% 0.10% 0.03% -0.09% 0.06% 0.00% 0.05% 0.18% 
2004 1.01% 0.09% -0.15% 0.83% -0.11% 0.11% 0.15% 0.61% 0.15% 0.00% 0.18% 0.23% 
2005 -0.11% 0.03% -0.20% 1.54% -0.12% 0.27% 0.10% 0.36% 0.21% 0.00% 0.14% 0.04% 
2006 0.31% 0.03% -0.23% 2.68% -0.07% 0.16% 0.10% 0.30% 0.24% 0.01% 0.08% 0.04% 
2007 1.25% 0.25% -0.02% 1.35% 0.00% 0.13% 0.05% 0.00% 0.18% 0.00% 0.09% 0.04% 
2008 2.22% 0.21% -0.04% 3.76% 0.01% 0.96% 0.22% -0.06% 0.21% 0.00% 0.23% 0.24% 
2009 0.34% 0.11% -0.08% 0.79% -0.04% 0.29% 0.22% -0.10% -0.04% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 
2010 0.29% 0.12% -0.08% 0.73% -0.04% 0.25% 0.21% -0.09% -0.01% 0.00% 0.09% 0.00% 
Notes:  Columns 1-12 refer to the first level of COICOP categories: 1. Food, Non-Alcoholic Beverages; 2. Alcoholic 
Beverages, Tobacco; 3. Clothing, Footwear; 4. Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas, Other Fuels; 5. Furnishings, 
Household Equipment, Routine Household Maintenance; 6. Health; 7. Transport; 8. Communication; 9. 
Recreation, Culture; 10. Education; 11. Restaurants, Hotels; 12. Miscellaneous Goods, Services 
 
For the whole sample, the most common “increaser” of the inflation rate was expenditure 
on housing and energy, because its price index rose very fast, and expenditure on food and 
non-alcoholic drinks, because this was the biggest expenditure group. The same holds for 
both subgroups. These two groups of expenditure increased the subgroup inflation rate by 
more than 1 percentage point in twelve years and in eight years, respectively. Comparing the 
magnitudes, both these expenditure groups had a greater absolute impact on the two 
subgroups’ inflation rates than on the aggregate one. This can be explained by the fact that 
both subgroups spend relatively more on these expenditure groups. Expenditure on 
transport was an “increaser” three times for the whole sample in the period 1995-2000, but 
only in 1996 for both the subgroups, because the subgroups spent relatively little on 
transport. Comparing the results for pensioner and low-income samples, the structure of 
“increasers” for both subgroups seems very similar with one minor exception – in 2008, 
pensioner expenditure for health caused the pensioner inflation rate to grow by 1.02%, 
whereas for low-income households it was 0.96%. We observe that there are no “reducers” 
with the one exception of food and non-alcoholic drinks expenditure for both subgroups in 
1999. 
The CZSO should consider constructing subgroup indices, ideally with regional variance, so as 
to be able to better distinguish the inflation rates faced by individual households. Some 
national statistical offices are already issuing subgroup indices (i.e. the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, as mentioned by Stewart (2008, page 19), the Indian Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation and the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, as 
discussed by Ley (2005, pages 634 and 641)). The question of exactly which and how many 
different price indices should be evaluated by the CZSO for the purposes of economic policy 
remains unanswered, and is beyond the scope of this paper. The introduction of more price 
indices should enable policy makers to design economic policies more precisely and 
therefore contribute to better evidence-based policy making. However, since many Czech 
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citizens do not even understand the meaning of the one, official, inflation rate, the cost of 
introducing this more detailed indexing might induce a higher level of public 
misunderstanding. 
Areas for further research include the analysis of further subgroups and of the impact of 
price shocks on various inflation rates. Combining the data and methods used here with 
information on real wages and other indicators would be also very useful and would provide 
a more complex picture of developments in the living standards of various households. 
Further research could make estimating the impact not only of inflation, but monetary policy 
more generally as well-established an exercise as that for fiscal policy, as demonstrated, for 
example, in Lustig et al. (2012) and Cormac & Preston (2012). A step in this direction is, for 
example, Romer & Romer (1998). Further, estimates of distributional impact of other 
policies would benefit from further research, ranging from fiscal consolidation in Ball et al. 
(2013) to globalisation in Goldberg & Pavcnik (2007). 
8. Conclusion 
This article has analysed the heterogeneity of household-specific inflation rates in the Czech 
Republic between 1995 and 2010. For this analysis we have used the most detailed data 
available on households, and on the prices of various goods and services, both nationwide 
and in the Prague region. By linking expenditure items with their respective price indices, we 
estimated the specific inflation rate for every household in the sample, which also enabled 
us to estimate subgroup inflation rates. We hope this analysis will attract increased attention 
to the often-neglected microeconomic implications of one of the most important 
macroeconomic variables. 
We have found that around 60% of the Czech households studied experienced an inflation 
rate within 1 percentage point of the national average inflation rate, and have further found 
a negative association between the average inflation rate and representativeness: the higher 
the magnitude of the average inflation rate over time, the lower the percentage of 
households who experience an inflation rate similar to the average. Our results also show 
that using the Prague-specific prices in calculations would result in lower inflation rates 
being reported for Prague households, which would better reflect the reality experienced by 
those Prague households. This implies that a bias is introduced when assuming that 
households from all regions face the same, nationwide prices. Before making specific policy 
recommendations, however, we suggest estimation of similar results for other regions and 
accounting for the differences not only in changes in prices, but also in price levels, both in 
cooperation with the Czech Statistical Office. 
We have compared the democratic and plutocratic average inflation rates and have 
demonstrated that the democratic average is more suitable for analysis of inflation 
differentials for subgroups of low-income and pensioner households. The average 
democratic inflation rates of these two subgroups are higher than the aggregate rate in all 
years except for 1999. For these two subgroup rates we identified the following determiners 
of high inflation: expenditure on housing, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels, and 
expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages. 
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Since the results presented here are the first of their kind for the Czech Republic and the 
results from previously published studies vary quite significantly across countries, our results 
may not necessarily have predictive power for the forthcoming years. Therefore, the results 
warrant regular updating and policy-makers should be relatively cautious and should not rely 
solely on our estimates. 
The cumulative inflation from 1994 to 2010 was estimated at 209% for pensioner 
households, and 213% for low-income households, in contrast to 193% for the whole 
sample. These differences could serve as a signal to Czech policy makers to begin applying 
knowledge of differences between subgroup inflation rates in their designs for evidence-
based policies. Applying this approach to the indexation of pensions and social benefits 
would be a good starting point. For example, a new indexation of pensions that would be 
dependent on pensioner-specific inflation rates, rather than on aggregate rates, could be 
considered. Of course, this kind of indexation, similarly to other detailed adjustments, has 
implementation and operation costs that need to be weighed against the possible benefits.  
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